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Krishna Kumar
I am Krishna Kumar the Takedown Team Lead at CloudSEK, an AI-driven cybersecurity company.I leads the team that removes phishing domains, fake apps, code repos and impersonating social media pages and other sources.I work with registrars, hosts, app stores and platforms like Meta to get threats taken down quickly.I focuses on fast, evidence-backed enforcement that protects both brands and their customers.
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Executive Summary

CloudSEK's contextual AI digital risk platform, XVigil, uncovered a rent-a-trojan service that lets fraudsters spin up fake Google Play pages and branded Android banking malware for Indian banks and card issuers in minutes. A fake credit-card "app" page impersonating a leading Indian private-sector bank collects card number, expiry, CVV, date of birth and mother's name, then pushes a sideloaded APK that steals every OTP and silently diverts the victim's calls.

One unprotected server hosted the whole operation: 50 tenant accounts, 34 of them on paid 7- to 60-day licences approved between 8 and 12 November 2026, targeting customers of six Indian banks and card issuers, along with users of government services. Both APK stages were decrypted and analysed statically, without running either sample, and no victim records were accessed. Lures and APKs impersonating three of the six institutions were still live on 14 November 2026.

Key findings

  • A fake "<BANK> CREDIT CARD - Apps on Google Play" page at hxxp://103.151.199[.]22:8080 copies the Play Store layout, streams every keystroke to the panel and pushes a 4.4 MB APK.
  • The APK is a dropper that fakes a Play Store install to slip past Android 13+ Restricted Settings, switches off Google Play Protect and installs a hidden SMS stealer.
  • The stealer forwards every bank OTP, uploads the SMS inbox and gallery photos, and sets call forwarding with **21*<number># so the bank's verification calls reach the fraudster.
  • The panel API answered without a login, exposing all 50 tenants and the brands they target; exfiltration runs through a Firebase project and 13 Telegram bots.
  • We assess with medium confidence that the operator is based in India, from Hinglish page text, the Asia/Kolkata time zone, Indian hosting and all-Indian targets.

Analysis and Attribution

The lure: a Play Store page that isn't

The page is titled "<BANK> CREDIT CARD - Apps on Google Play" and copies the Play Store layout with the impersonated bank's logo, a 4.8-star rating, "500K+ downloads" and a "Play Protect Verified" badge. Its form asks for mother's name and date of birth, then card number, expiry and CVV. The page script streams every keystroke to the panel before the victim presses submit, so even abandoned forms leak data. It then tells the victim the "web portal is inactive" and walks them, in Hinglish, through installing the APK.

The server has no domain and no CDN in front of it, which sidesteps domain-reputation checks and registrar takedowns. The operator's one domain, used for a WebSocket node, is already on clientHold, yet the page simply falls back to the bare IP and keeps working.

One panel, 50 tenants

The lure is one "party" in a multi-tenant malware-as-a-service panel. Each tenant picks a brand, a page design (Play Store clone, netbanking portal or bare download page), a card-data form and its own Telegram bot; the panel then builds a branded APK. Of the 34 approved tenants, 19 went live on 10 November 2026. Tenant names reveal the target mix, summarised below with institutions anonymised:

Lure theme Tenants seen Live on 14 Nov 2026
Bank A (private sector): credit card and limit increase 5 Page + APK
Card issuer B: credit card and pension card 3 Page + APK
Bank C: credit card 2 Page + APK
Bank D (private sector) 3 APK only
Bank E (private sector): pension card 1 APK only
Card issuer F (fintech) 1 APK only
Government service: traffic e-challan 3 APK only
Government service: farmer income-support scheme 1 APK only

Source: CloudSEK research

Two stages: a dropper, then a hidden SMS stealer

Stage 1: the dropper (com.secure.android.manager). Its label reads "<BANK> CREDIT CARD", padded with invisible Unicode characters, and it asks for only three permissions, so it looks harmless at install. It XOR-decrypts a 4.4 MB asset into a second APK and installs it while posing as the Play Store (com.android.vending), so Android 13+ treats it as a store install and skips Restricted Settings, the technique ThreatFabric documented as SecuriDropper in 2023. It then disables Google Play Protect's verifier and starts a local VPN that routes Play Store and Play Services traffic into a dead tunnel. Emulator, Frida, Xposed and Magisk checks frustrate analysis.

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dropper_playprotect.png

Fig 1: Dropper code disabling the Google Play Protect verifier (decoded strings shown as comments)

Stage 2: the payload (com.userdb.customer). It has no launcher icon, restarts on nine boot and power events and runs a watchdog service. On commands delivered through Firebase Cloud Messaging it forwards every incoming SMS, including bank OTPs, to the C2, to Telegram and to an operator phone number; uploads the SMS inbox and gallery photos, which often include card, Aadhaar and PAN images; sends SMS from the victim's number; and sets call forwarding with **21*<number>#. Together with the card details from the fake page, this gives the operator everything needed for card-not-present fraud.

payload_callforward.png

Fig 2: Payload code building the **21* USSD call-forwarding command

Infrastructure and attribution

  • Panel, lures and APKs: 103.151.199[.]22:8080 on AS152565 (Joy Services), registered to a Mumbai cable broadband provider.
  • Payload C2: a WebSocket on 103.129.96[.]11:8080, in an IP range registered to an Indian non-banking financial company and routed by AS153233; the host is most likely compromised or misused.
  • Push commands and storage: a Firebase project (partially redacted in the IOCs below).
  • Exfiltration alerts: 13 Telegram bots, with one admin chat receiving alerts from 24 of the 26 branded tenants.

No real-world individual was identified, and the APKs carry no developer paths or emails. The page text is Hinglish ("Kripya authorized Android Application (APK) use karein"), times are formatted in Asia/Kolkata, both servers sit on Indian networks and every target is an Indian brand. Tenant names that resemble personal first names most likely belong to customers or resellers, not the panel owner. This attribution is made with MEDIUM confidence that the operator is based in India, because these indicators are consistent but circumstantial.

Impact

The victims are Indian cardholders, farmers, vehicle owners and pensioners. Six banks and card issuers are cloned directly, and one issuer's co-brand card art appears in the lure banner. Government-service themes (a farmer income-support scheme, traffic e-challans and pensioners' life certificates) widen the net. From each victim the panel can collect full card details with CVV, date of birth and mother's name, every OTP, the SMS inbox, photos of identity documents, and control of call forwarding. Victim records were referred to the affected institutions, CERT-In and I4C.

Mitigations:

For bank customers

  1. Install banking apps only from Google Play or the App Store by searching for your bank's name, and check the developer name before installing.
  2. Never install an APK from a link, SMS or WhatsApp message. A real Play Store page never asks for your card number or CVV.
  3. If you installed one, dial ##002# to cancel all call forwarding, block your card through official channels, uninstall the app and report it at cybercrime.gov.in or by calling 1930.

For banks, card issuers and security teams

  1. Block the indicators below at network, email and mobile threat-defence layers.
  2. Watch for call-forwarding activation and new-device OTP use around card-not-present transactions; together they are a strong signal of this trojan.
  3. Publish an advisory naming your only official app package and telling customers never to sideload.
  4. Report hosting, Firebase and Telegram abuse quickly: the panel builds a new branded APK in minutes, so the control layer matters more than any single lure URL.

CloudSEK platform actions

  1. Add your brand names, official app package names and domains to XVigil to detect fake Play Store pages, rogue APKs and look-alike lures targeting your customers, and to request takedowns.
  2. Use BeVigil to analyse suspicious APKs that carry your brand and to audit your official apps for exposed secrets.

Indicators of Compromise

All values are defanged. Hashes are SHA-256. Values that would identify targeted institutions are partially redacted; full values are available to vetted partners on request.

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