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Situation Report: Middle East Escalation (February 27–1st March, 2026)

The report examines the sharp escalation following the 28 February 2026 joint Israel–U.S. strikes on Iran, triggering a hybrid conflict blending kinetic attacks with unprecedented cyber operations. Iran faced near-total internet disruption, while retaliatory missile and cyber activity spread across Israel, the Gulf, and beyond. Over 150 hacktivist incidents were recorded, with global spillover risks to energy, finance, IT, and critical infrastructure sectors

March 2, 2026

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Executive Summary

This report analyzes the rapidly evolving geopolitical and cyber landscape in the Middle East following the joint Israeli–United States strikes on Iran launched on 28 February 2026, and the associated cyber operations and spillover risks from 27 February- 1st March 2026 and ongoing. The conflict has entered a hybrid phase combining large-scale kinetic strikes, near-total disruption of Iran’s digital environment, and heightened cyber threat activity affecting both regional and global IT and critical-infrastructure sectors.

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Key Findings

Israel and the United States have conducted coordinated strikes on Iranian leadership, military, and nuclear sites under Operation Roaring Lion/Epic Fury, while Iran has retaliated with missile barrages across Israel and U.S. regional bases.
Parallel to the kinetic campaign, Israel launched what has been described as the largest cyberattack in history against Iran, contributing to a near-total internet blackout, disruption of government services, media, and parts of energy and aviation infrastructure.
The UAE and other Gulf states reported waves of sophisticated and increasingly AI‑enabled cyberattacks on government systems, finance, and vital sectors from 21–26 February 2026, which national authorities say were systematically detected and foiled using coordinated monitoring and response, keeping essential services online.
Iran’s long-standing use of IRGC/MOIS-directed APTs and deputized hacktivist groups provides a ready toolset for asymmetric retaliation against Israel, the United States, Gulf states, and second-order countries with economic or political ties to the conflict.
Second-order affected countries including India, European states, Japan, and South Korea face elevated risk from espionage, supply-chain compromise, DDoS, ransomware, and disinformation as threat actors exploit global interdependencies in energy, finance, shipping, and IT services.
Global supply chains and energy flows are facing new disruption, as oil and gas majors and traders temporarily suspend shipments via the Strait of Hormuz, major container lines pull vessels from Hormuz/Red Sea lanes, and Indian and European exporters report higher freight and insurance costs and longer transit times, particularly on India–Europe/US lanes.

Recommendations for Organizations

Immediate Preventive Actions to increase the barrier of entry for attempting threat actors.

Enterprise-wide credential reset: Conduct an organization-wide credential rotation for all employees. This will prepare your organization for attacks from hacktivist and low- to moderate-level threat actors that rely on credential-based compromise.
For Xvigil users: Use the Compromised Computer module and Credential Breaches module to check leaked credentials across the deep and dark web. From Magnitude, select HIGH to filter and prioritize critical leaked credentials.
Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA ): on all external access paths, particularly VPN, RDP, SSH, and cloud admin consoles.

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For BeVigil users: To further harden your assets, patch critical findings identified in Web App Scanners and CVE Scanners to eliminate low-hanging threats and increase the barrier of entry for attempting threat actors.

Strategic CTI and Governance

Align with government advisories: Track DHS, ENISA, national CERT, and sectoral ISAC alerts related to Iranian and regional threats; integrate IOCs and TTP updates into SIEM and detection engineering workflows.
Define escalation and crisis playbooks: Establish clear criteria for moving to “heightened alert” modes (analogous to “Shields Up”), including stepped-up monitoring, staff augmentation, and restricted change windows for critical systems.

Technical Controls and Hardening

Identity, Access, and Perimeter:

Audit VPN and remote-access appliances for backdoors, unknown accounts, and unauthorized configuration changes; patch urgently and segment management interfaces.
Implement conditional access and session controls to mitigate AiTM and token-theft attacks highlighted as major threats in the region.

Network and Endpoint Security:

Deploy robust EDR/XDR and log collection across endpoints and servers; prioritize detections for known Iranian and Middle East APT behaviors (Cobalt Strike, web shells, PowerShell abuse, credential dumping).
Monitor for anomalous DNS responses, unexpected HTTP redirects, and self-signed or untrusted TLS certificates as potential indicators of traffic interception or redirection.

DDoS and Availability:

Engage with ISPs and cloud providers to ensure surge-capable DDoS mitigation and traffic scrubbing, with specific playbooks for government, finance, and media workloads that may be targeted for political impact.

Data Protection and Recovery:

Maintain offline, immutable backups for critical systems, particularly ICS/OT, healthcare, and core business applications; regularly test restoration under simulated wiper or ransomware scenarios.

Monitoring and Detection Priorities

Geographic and partner-based filtering: Apply enhanced scrutiny to traffic from and to Middle Eastern IP ranges, and to connections involving regional partners or suppliers in high-risk sectors.
Threat-hunting for long-dwell APTs: Conduct hunts focused on VPN logs, identity infrastructure, and edge devices to identify potential long-term compromise, as highlighted by recent campaigns.
Hacktivist and disinformation monitoring: Track Telegram, social media, and public “ops” channels for indications of coordinated campaigns targeting your sector or geography, especially for organizations in finance, government, and media.

Geopolitical Context and Escalation Timeline

Pre-2026 Background: Iran–Israel–US Tensions

For over a decade, Iran and Israel have engaged in covert and overt confrontation involving proxy conflicts, targeted assassinations, and sustained cyber operations. Iran’s post-Stuxnet strategy positioned cyber capabilities as a core asymmetric pillar, enabling disruption of regional infrastructure, espionage, and influence campaigns via proxies with plausible deniability.

The 2023–2024 Gaza war and subsequent Iran–Israel skirmishes accelerated this trajectory, including reported Israeli-attributed attacks on Iranian fuel distribution, steel plants, and financial institutions linked to groups such as “Predatory Sparrow.” In June 2025, a twelve-day Iran–Israel conflict featured coordinated hacktivist and APT activity, hundreds of claimed cyberattacks, and increased GPS spoofing and information operations across the region.

Lead-up to February 2026 Strikes

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By early 2026, U.S. Iran and Israel–Iran tensions escalated over Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and regional proxy activity, alongside a significant U.S. military buildup in the Middle East. Analysts warned that Iran’s cyber ecosystem APT33/35, OilRig/MuddyWater, and IRGC-aligned hacktivist groups would serve as a frontline tool in any renewed confrontation.

Concurrently, regional cyber activity intensified:

GCC states, particularly the UAE, reported daily sophisticated and AI-enhanced cyberattacks targeting government and financial sectors.
Multiple firms observed VPN backdoor exploitation, persistent web shells, and multi-sector targeting across finance, healthcare, education, technology, and retail.
CTI advisories noted long-term Iranian APT footholds in Middle Eastern critical infrastructure via credential theft and VPN compromise since early 2025.

February 27–28, 2026: Kinetic and Cyber Escalation

On 28 February 2026, Israel and the United States launched coordinated strikes on Iranian leadership compounds, IRGC facilities, and nuclear-related infrastructure under the codenames Roaring Lion and Operation Epic Fury. Targets included Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, Karaj, Kermanshah, and other strategic sites. Strikes reportedly damaged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s compound and disrupted senior security leadership communications.

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Iran retaliated with ballistic missiles and drones targeting Israel and U.S. bases across Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, while the Houthi movement in Yemen resumed Red Sea attacks.
Simultaneously, reports described a large-scale Israeli cyber operation against Iran characterized as the largest in history resulting in widespread digital disruption and a nationwide “digital fog.”

Countries Directly and Indirectly Involved

Primary Belligerents

Iran🇮🇷 – Target of the joint strikes and principal adversary in the confrontation. The IRGC and Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) oversee a mature cyber ecosystem combining state-aligned APTs and proxy hacktivist groups capable of espionage, disruption, and coordinated influence operations.

Israel 🇮🇱– Lead regional military actor conducting strikes on Iranian territory and a longstanding cyber adversary of Iran, with a history of offensive cyber operations attributed to Unit 8200 and groups such as Predatory Sparrow.

United States🇺🇸– Strategic partner to Israel and co-lead of the 28 February 2026 strikes, maintaining extensive Gulf basing and a sustained record of cyber confrontation with Iran, particularly around nuclear and critical infrastructure issues.

Regional States Under Fire or Elevated Risk

In retaliation, Iran launched missiles and drones targeting Israel and U.S. facilities across multiple states:

Jordan – Hosts U.S. forces and missile defense assets.
Syria – Operational theater for Iranian proxies and U.S./coalition forces.
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE – Major U.S. basing hubs and economic centers, making them potential kinetic and cyber targets.

Simultaneously, Lebanon and Yemen-based proxies including Hezbollah and the Houthis have increased pressure, elevating maritime, aviation, and related cyber risk exposure.

Second-Order Affected Countries

States with economic, diplomatic, or digital ties to the region face spillover and sectoral disruption risks:

India – Major Gulf energy importer and IT/BPO provider serving Middle Eastern and Israeli clients.
European Union states (notably Germany, France, United Kingdom) – Host financial, industrial, and energy firms active in Gulf and Israeli markets and are frequent targets of Iranian-linked cyber activity.
Japan and South Korea – Technology and industrial economies exposed through Middle Eastern energy dependence and supply-chain-linked ICS risks.
Turkey – Regional logistics and telecom hub bridging Europe and the Middle East, with exposure via transit routes and energy corridors.

Cyber Activities: What, When, and How (February 27–28 and Immediate Context)

Israel’s Cyber Offensive Against Iran

As airstrikes began on 28 February 2026, Israel reportedly launched a large-scale cyber campaign aimed at paralyzing Iran’s information, command, and critical infrastructure networks.

What (effects):

Internet connectivity in Iran dropped to roughly 4% of normal levels, resulting in a near-total nationwide blackout.
Critical infrastructure, official media (including IRNA and IRGC-linked Tasnim), and security communications systems were severely disrupted, contributing to leadership communication breakdowns.
Government digital services and local applications in cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz experienced widespread outages.

When:

Disruptions intensified on 28 February 2026, within hours of the start of joint air operations, with independent monitors confirming the sharp connectivity decline that day.

How (likely mechanisms):

Electronic warfare, including jamming and spoofing of navigation and communications systems.
DDoS attacks against government and media infrastructure.
Deep network intrusions targeting energy and aviation systems, potentially leveraging prior access or zero-day vulnerabilities.
Media hijacking or defacement to disseminate anti-regime messaging.

The scale of disruption suggests Iran’s “national internet” fallback architecture was overwhelmed, causing systemic segmentation failures.

Iran’s Cyber and Information Response

Despite restricted connectivity, reporting and prior conflict patterns indicate a dual defensive and offensive response.

Immediate defensive measures:

State-enforced internet restrictions resembling previous protest and conflict shutdowns, likely intended to limit adversary C2 visibility, manage dissent, and obscure battlefield developments.
Tightened communication controls for officials, with greater reliance on closed and secure networks.

Offensive trends (current and historical patterns):

Coordinated IRGC/MOIS APT and hacktivist operations sharing tools and infrastructure.
Targeting of Israeli and U.S. government and defense entities, financial institutions, media, healthcare, water utilities, and critical infrastructure across the Middle East and Western states.
Use of spear-phishing, VPN and edge-device exploitation, web shells, custom malware (including wipers), and ICS/OT-focused tooling.

As connectivity stabilizes, asymmetric retaliation through proxy and hacktivist fronts remains highly likely.

UAE and GCC: AI-Backed Attacks and Elevated Alert

In the week preceding the strikes, the UAE disclosed that it had foiled coordinated AI-backed cyber campaigns targeting vital sectors.

What:

AI-enhanced phishing, malware, and ransomware attempts against government systems and financial institutions.
At least 128 confirmed cyber threat incidents in early 2026, heavily affecting government administration, banking, and financial services.

When:

Publicly disclosed on 22–23 February 2026, days before the February 27–28 escalation, amid a broader rise in regional cyber activity.

How:

Adaptive social engineering, obfuscated payloads, automated infrastructure changes, and network infiltration attempts.

Although attribution remains unconfirmed, timing and tradecraft are consistent with state-aligned or terror-linked actors probing regional defenses.

Other Cyber Threats

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An Iranian app used to track Muslim prayer times was reportedly hacked, with users receiving alarming push notifications containing political and military messages. The messages allegedly urged members of the armed forces to defect and “protect your compatriots,” promising protection in return, while others declared “Help has arrived” and “It’s the time for reckoning.” The incident highlights how widely used digital platforms and even religious apps can become targets for cyberattacks and be leveraged to spread propaganda or destabilizing messages during periods of tension.

Hacktivist Campaign Activity (February 28 – March 1, 2026)

Between 28 February and 1 March 2026, over 150 hacktivist incidents were claimed in open hacktivist channels monitored by CloudSek’s Middle East feeds. The activity is explicitly tied to the current escalation involving Israel, Palestine and Iran, and is dominated by DDoS, website defacement and claimed data-breach operations against government, financial, aviation, telecom and other critical-infrastructure targets in the region.

While attribution is self-reported and technical validation is limited for some claims, the volume, target clustering and overlapping messaging indicate multiple loosely coordinated campaigns rather than isolated one-off attacks.

Major Hacktivist Groups and Campaigns

Between 28 February and 1 March 2026, multiple hacktivist groups conducted or claimed coordinated disruptive cyber activity aligned primarily along pro-Iran and pro-Palestine narratives. The majority of operations involved DDoS attacks, website disruption, defacement claims, data-leak assertions and coordinated propaganda messaging targeting Israel and states perceived as supporting Israeli or U.S. policy.

Pro-Iran / Anti-Israel Aligned Actors

DieNet Network / DieNet Network V5 led large-scale DDoS campaigns targeting government portals, telecom providers, airports and financial institutions across Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United States, describing the activity as retaliation for perceived aggression against Iran.
SylhetGangSG1 / SYLHET GANG SG / Anonymous Sylhet conducted DDoS attacks against Middle Eastern government and infrastructure entities, including Israeli corporate assets.
Cyber Islamic Resistance focused on alliance-building and campaign coordination, announcing cooperation with other hacktivist and APT-branded actors to amplify operations against Israel, the U.S. and states hosting U.S. military bases.

Pro-Palestine / Anti-Israel Aligned Actors

Nation of Saviors claimed DDoS attacks, website compromise and data exfiltration, including disruption of Israel’s Education Ministry and a 21 GB data-theft claim against a Saudi private entity.
RipperSec conducted DDoS campaigns against Israeli government and drone-related assets and issued time-specific disruption announcements.
DarkStormTeam claimed DDoS operations and data-leak activity against Israeli financial entities, with some spillover targeting in Saudi Arabia.
DragonForce Malaysia focused primarily on threat messaging and mobilization content directed at Israeli infrastructure.
GhostPrincess / TheGhostsITM amplified #OpIsrael campaigns, coordinated messaging across GCC states and promoted threats against Israeli utilities and defense-adjacent entities.
ARABIAN_GHOSTS issued broad threat statements targeting Israel, the United States, Saudi Arabia and the UAE under #OpIsraelTeam branding.
Babayo Error System & Keymous Plus announced large-scale intended operations against Israel and India, though with limited technical substantiation.

Anti-Jordan / Anti-Qatar / Anti-Iran Activity

Handala Group claimed disruption of Jordanian gas-station infrastructure, asserting a nationwide shutdown (unverified).
BD Anonymous Team targeted Qatar’s Ministry of Interior online services with DDoS activity, framing actions around geopolitical grievances.
404 CREW CYBER TEAM / Disrupt0r conducted operations against Iranian CCTV systems and disclosed web vulnerabilities, while also referencing Israeli targets.

Overall Pattern

Across groups, activity shows:

Heavy reliance on DDoS as the primary tactic
Overlapping target sets across GCC states and Israel
Coordinated propaganda and alliance signaling
Blending of hacktivist branding with higher-capability threat actor narratives

The campaigns reflect loosely coordinated, narrative-driven cyber disruption rather than isolated, independent incidents.

Attack Type Distribution

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Primary Target Emphasis

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Sectoral Distribution

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Common TTP & Tooling Distribution

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Impact on Involved Countries’ IT and Digital Ecosystems

Iran Digital Isolation and Infrastructure Strain

Iran experienced severe digital disruption following widespread connectivity loss and cyber-kinetic activity.

Connectivity collapse: Internet traffic reportedly dropped to ~4% of normal levels, severely constraining cross-border commerce, financial flows and remote operations.
Government-service disruption: Outages across portals and public-service platforms hindered healthcare coordination, logistics and administrative continuity.
National intranet pressure: Domestic routing and “national internet” systems struggled under combined internal and external stress, leaving critical services unstable.

Israel Elevated Threat Environment Despite Strong Cyber Posture

While Israel maintains a highly advanced cybersecurity ecosystem, escalation has intensified asymmetric cyber pressure.

Phishing and credential theft: Iranian-linked campaigns continue targeting officials, journalists, academics and critical workforce segments via spoofed login portals and malicious attachments.
Critical infrastructure focus: Hospitals, water systems and industrial facilities remain persistent targets; attempted compromises have been detected and mitigated but indicate sustained adversary intent.
High-tech exposure: Israel’s dense cybersecurity, fintech and startup ecosystem makes it both resilient and symbolically attractive for data theft, disruption and extortion operations.

United States and NATO-Linked Regional Presence

Direct military involvement and extensive Gulf basing elevate cyber risk exposure.

Critical infrastructure targeting: Iranian APTs have historically probed U.S. water, energy, healthcare and ICS environments using brute-force, credential-stuffing and vulnerability exploitation.
Supply-chain and contractor risk: Defense suppliers, logistics operators and satellite/maritime communications providers linked to regional operations remain likely espionage and disruption targets.

Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait)

Gulf states are strategically exposed due to energy infrastructure, financial hubs and U.S. military presence.

Sectoral targeting: Government, oil & gas, banking, aviation and telecom sectors have faced sophisticated phishing, ransomware and disruption campaigns in early 2026.
AI-enabled threats: Increasing use of generative AI enhances phishing realism, fraud scale and ransomware social-engineering effectiveness.
Regulatory response vs. gaps: Cyber investment and oversight are accelerating, yet weaknesses persist in OT/ICS segmentation, third-party risk governance and rapid-response maturity.

Second-Order Affected Countries and IT-Sector Outlook

Overview of Spillover Channels

Countries not directly involved in the conflict remain exposed through indirect economic, digital and infrastructure dependencies. Key spillover channels include:

Energy and commodity markets: Price volatility and supply disruptions can constrain industrial output, increase operating costs and shift IT spending priorities away from transformation initiatives toward resilience and risk management.
Digital supply chains: Organizations relying on outsourced IT services, cloud hosting, cybersecurity vendors or BPO providers in the Middle East and Israel may experience service instability, delayed delivery timelines or heightened third-party risk exposure.
Shared global infrastructure: Maritime and aviation logistics systems, satellite networks, submarine cable routes and cloud regions serving or transiting the Middle East represent systemic interdependencies. Disruptions or targeting in these hubs can produce cascading effects beyond the immediate conflict zone.

Country/Region	Key Links to Middle East	Expected Cyber & IT Impact
India	Major importer of Middle Eastern energy; extensive IT/BPO service provision for Gulf and Israeli firms; growing defense and tech ties.	Heightened risk of DDoS, phishing, and extortion targeting Indian IT providers and financial institutions connected to Israeli/Gulf clients; potential attempts to compromise Indian cloud or data-center infrastructure as a pivot into regional networks.
EU (Germany, France, UK)	Hosts energy majors, banks, and industrial firms with significant Gulf and Israeli exposure; political backing for U.S./Israel varies but visible.	Surge in politically motivated DDoS, data leaks, and ransomware against banks, energy companies, and government portals seen as supportive of Israel/U.S.; increased disinformation operations to influence public opinion and policy.
Japan & South Korea	Key buyers of Middle Eastern oil and gas; technology vendors and shipbuilders supporting Gulf infrastructure and logistics.	Cyber-espionage against energy, shipping, and industrial firms; risk of ICS/OT compromise in projects linked to Gulf infrastructure; potential disruptions in maritime logistics IT platforms.
Turkey	Transit hub for energy pipelines and regional internet traffic; complex relations with Iran, Israel, and NATO.	Exposure of telecom and IXPs to probing and DDoS, potential compromise of hosting and VPN providers as staging grounds; risk of politically driven attacks by both pro- and anti-Iran/Israel hacktivist groups.

Global IT Sector Trends Under Escalation

Ransomware and data-extortion growth: Threat actors increasingly blend nation-state and criminal motives, using ransomware and data leaks to fund operations and exert geopolitical pressure, with the Middle East as a major hotspot.
AI-enhanced operations: Large language models and generative AI are being used for phishing, malware customization, and disinformation, already evident in regional campaigns and expected to expand globally.
Third-party and VPN exploitation: Persistent attacks on VPNs and edge devices highlight the need to harden remote-access paths and monitor infrastructure for unauthorized changes or backdoors.

Sector-Specific Threat Outlook

Energy and Critical Infrastructure (Oil, Gas, Power, Water)

Regional focus: Iran, Israel, and Gulf energy infrastructure is highly targeted due to strategic and global market importance.
Threats: ICS/OT attacks, wipers disguised as ransomware, GPS spoofing affecting pipelines and maritime operations, DDoS against trading/logistics platforms.
Global spillover: Energy companies and utilities outside the region face increased espionage and ransomware risks if ICS systems are compromised.

Government and Defense

Targets: Ministries of defense, interior, foreign affairs, and intelligence in Israel, Iran, U.S., and Gulf states.
Tactics: APT campaigns using phishing, credential theft, web shells, and custom malware; hacktivists amplify DDoS and leak campaigns for political impact.

Financial Services and Fintech

Regional hubs: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel face AI-backed phishing, ransomware, and intrusion attempts on banking and payment systems.
Second-order markets: European and Asian banks connected to Middle Eastern trade may see politically motivated DDoS and data-theft campaigns.

Healthcare and Public Services

Regional focus: Hospitals and medical centers in Israel and neighboring states targeted by Iranian-linked actors; successful attacks could disrupt emergency response and morale.
Humanitarian organizations: NGOs in conflict zones may face data-theft, disinformation, and targeted cyberattacks against staff and beneficiaries.

IT, Cloud, and Telecom Providers

Regional providers: ISPs and cloud platforms in Iran, Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf may be directly targeted or used as staging grounds for broader attacks.
Global providers: Hyperscalers and managed service providers serving Middle Eastern workloads face elevated risk around identity, control planes, and administrative management consoles.

Sector-Specific Recommendations

Energy and Critical Infrastructure

Strengthen IT–OT segmentation; strictly limit remote access to ICS environments.
Implement anomaly detection on process variables and engineering workstations to detect suspicious activity.

Finance and Banking

Strengthen anti-fraud and transaction-monitoring systems against AI-generated social engineering and BEC attacks.
Coordinate sector-wide tabletop exercises simulating Iranian-linked ransomware or DDoS campaigns.

Healthcare

Prioritize network segmentation for clinical systems and secure backups for EHR and imaging.
Develop manual fallback procedures for critical care during cyber-induced outages.

IT, Cloud, and MSPs

Harden management planes and enforce just-in-time / just-enough access for administrators.
Include explicit incident reporting, threat intelligence sharing, and joint response clauses in customer and supplier contracts.

Organizational Preparedness and Training

Conduct awareness campaigns on spear-phishing, AI-generated scams, and deepfake social engineering.
Run red-team and purple-team exercises simulating Iranian APT and hacktivist tactics to validate detection and response capabilities.

Conclusion

The 28 February – 1 March 2026 period illustrates a highly interconnected cyber threat environment, where:

Hacktivist, criminal, and nation-state actors converge, leveraging DDoS, ransomware, data exfiltration, and AI-enabled attacks.
Directly involved countries face immediate disruption to government, financial, energy, healthcare, and defense systems, while second-order countries are affected through supply chains, energy markets, and shared infrastructure.
Organizations must adopt holistic cyber resilience strategies, combining technical hardening, sector-specific defenses, cross-border coordination, and staff preparedness to mitigate both direct and spillover risks.

The evolving landscape demonstrates that cyber operations are now a core component of geopolitical escalation, requiring continuous monitoring, adaptive response planning, and proactive international cooperation to protect critical digital ecosystems.

References

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CloudSEK Threat Intelligence

CloudSEK's Threat Intelligence team, a group of cybersecurity experts led by Koushik Sivaraman, primarily focuses on the research and analysis of threat intelligence related to threat actors, malware, vulnerability/ exploitation, data breach incidents, etc.

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