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Executive Summary

Imagine, you have been waiting for this one match. CSK vs RCB - the biggest rivalry in Indian cricket. You've ordered your jersey, and told everyone at work you're unavailable. But when ticket sales opened, they sold out in minutes. 

You slump onto your couch, scrolling through Instagram Reels in quiet disappointment - when suddenly, a reel appears. A page offering tickets at a discounted price, "limited slots available". The account looks legitimate. Thousands of followers. A highlight reel of happy customers. You tap the link in the bio. 

The website loads cleanly. It has the right logos, the right colors, a professional layout. You fill in your details, make a quick UPI payment, and within minutes, a PDF ticket lands in your inbox. You screenshot it, send it to the group chat, and head to the stadium buzzing with excitement. The queue moves. You reach the gate. The scanner beeps - and the guard shakes his head.

"Sir, yeh ticket fake hai."

You've been scammed. The money is gone. The match goes on without you.

This is not a one-off story. This is happening at scale every IPL season - across fraud verticals that collectively defraud tens of thousands of Indians every season. 

This blog is CloudSEK's attempt to pull back the curtain. We'll walk you through the most active cyber threats dominating this IPL season - from convincingly fake ticketing websites that leave fans stranded at the gates, to malicious “free streaming” traps that silently compromise devices.

Key Findings

  • Over 600 fraudulent domains were identified, scamming fans with convincingly fake IPL tickets.
  • More than 400 fake “free streaming” sites were uncovered, many operating as active malware delivery channels distributing infostealers designed to steal passwords, drain crypto wallets, backdoor applications, and deploy persistent remote access on victim devices.
  • Unofficial streaming sites now reach victims through AI-generated search overviews due to community recommendations extending their spread well beyond traditional search results.
  • Admin panel access to sites selling fake tickets exposed a structured backend with real-time booking data, manual payment verification, dynamic pricing controls, and one-click generation of fake tickets - along with systematic collection and storage of victim data.

Threat Landscape Overview 

The Indian Premier League isn’t just a cricket tournament - it’s a high-velocity digital economy. With over 600 million viewers, sold-out stadiums, and billions of rupees moving in a compressed nine-to-ten-week window, it creates a rare convergence of scale, urgency, and emotion. This combination of mass attention, emotional investment, and financial activity makes it one of the most exploited events in India's cybercrime calendar.

What makes the IPL especially attractive is user behaviour. Fans are time-sensitive (tickets sell out in minutes), emotionally invested (loyalty to teams and players), and often willing to take risks - whether it’s chasing last-minute tickets or looking for free streams. Attackers design their campaigns precisely around these triggers.

The fraud ecosystem does not wait for the tournament to begin. Domains get registered, social media pages get seeded, and Telegram channels start building their audiences even before the first ball is bowled. By opening day, the operation is already at full scale. 

As the tournament progresses, so does the intensity of these operations. Big matches, rivalries, playoffs, - attackers mirror them with targeted campaigns, flash scams, and higher volumes of outreach through ads, SMS, and social platforms. The infrastructure behind these scams - payment channels, mule accounts, SEO networks, and malware distribution - operates continuously in the background, adapting in real time.

By the time the final concludes, the ecosystem doesn’t collapse - it simply goes dormant. Channels go quiet, domains are abandoned or repurposed, and operators cash out and regroup. Then, as the next IPL season approaches, the cycle begins again - faster, more refined, and harder to detect.

Threat #1 - Fake IPL Ticket Booking Networks

CloudSEK researchers identified multiple fake domains actively claiming to sell IPL tickets this season. These sites do not look like scams at first glance. They impersonate legitimate ticketing platforms by lifting logos, color schemes, and UI layouts directly from trusted brands like BookMyShow and District, creating an experience familiar enough to disarm suspicion.

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Snapshot displaying a fraudulent domain impersonating District and falsely offering IPL tickets for sale

On top of that, they layer in elements designed to manufacture urgency and FOMO - countdown timers ticking toward a "sale end" deadline, banners reading "Only 3 seats left at this price".

Snapshot displaying a fraudulent domain impersonating BookMyShow

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Snapshot of the fake domain displaying match fixtures and ticket booking options 

These domains are then pushed in front of potential victims through multiple channels. Reels and posts on Instagram and Facebook create organic reach, while Meta Ads allow operators to pay for targeted placement in front of cricket fans. 

Snapshot displaying a Meta Ad promoting a fraudulent IPL ticket booking site

On the search engine side, these sites are optimized for high-intent keywords - terms like "Ticket Booking - IPL Match" and "IPL 2026 Tickets" - designed to get them indexed on Google and appear alongside, or even above, legitimate results.

Snapshot displaying the fraudulent IPL ticket booking website appearing in Google search results

The flow from there is straightforward. Once a victim lands on the site and clicks to book a ticket, they are prompted to select their seat and enter their personal details - name, phone number, email. After that comes the payment step, where victims are asked to pay via UPI, card, QR code or payment gateways. 

Snapshot displaying the seat selection feature on the fake booking site, designed to appear legitimate to users
Snapshot displaying a booking details form designed to appear authentic while collecting victims’ personally identifiable information (PII)

Once the payment goes through, the victim receives a confirmation email with a PDF ticket attached. The document looks convincing - it carries the right branding, seat details, and what appears to be a valid barcode or QR code. But the booking numbers are fabricated and the QR codes would not scan at any legitimate venue entry point. The first time the victim finds out is at the stadium gate.

Snapshot of the fake IPL ticket generated after payment designed to mimic a genuine booking confirmation
Snapshot of another fake IPL ticket received by the victim via email after completing the payment

Sample Set of Fake Domains

Listed below are a few from the many fake domains identified by CloudSEK, impersonating legitimate ticketing brands and promoting the sale of fake IPL match tickets, registered between March - April 2026.

Suspicious IPL Ticketing Domains Identified Newly registered domains impersonating popular ticketing platforms and IPL-related booking services.
No. Fake Domain Registration Date
1bookmyshow-ipl-ticket[.]com Fake Domain2026-03-30
2bookmyshowticket[.]com Fake Domain2026-04-19
3bookmyiplticket[.]com Fake Domain2026-04-15
4bookm-show[.]shop Fake Domain2026-03-28
5bookmyticket[.]sbs Fake Domain2026-03-31
6ipl2026-ticket[.]online Fake Domain2026-04-16
7bookmy-show[.]com Fake Domain2026-03-29
8book-myshow[.]com Fake Domain2026-03-20
9book-iplticket[.]com Fake Domain2026-04-18
10pavilliontickets[.]com Fake Domain2026-04-23
11iplticket[.]online Fake Domain2026-03-29
12book-ipl-ticket-2026[.]online Fake Domain2026-04-12
13ipl-ticket-booking[.]online Fake Domain2026-04-01
14iplticket[.]store Fake Domain2026-04-10
15stadium-seat-booking[.]online Fake Domain2026-04-21
16book-your-ticket[.]online Fake Domain2026-03-31
17book-my-ticket[.]store Fake Domain2026-04-04
18ipl-tickets-booking[.]live Fake Domain2026-04-27
19thebookmyshow[.]in Fake Domain2026-04-01
20pavillion-tickets[.]com Fake Domain2026-04-29
‍Treemap visualization showing the distribution of registrars used by fake IPL ticketing websites, with GoDaddy and Hostinger accounting for the largest share

Behind The Scenes - Admin Panel Access

CloudSEK researchers were able to access the admin panel of one of these fake domains. This panel is likely associated with multiple other fake IPL ticket selling domains spawned from the same phishing kit - a ready-made fraud infrastructure that can be deployed repeatedly with minimal effort.

With admin access, the backend process stood completely exposed. What we found was not a rudimentary setup - it was a fully functional operations dashboard with real-time order management, victim data tables, a ticket price manager, UPI and bank account details of the TA, and a dedicated matches management module.

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Snapshot of the admin panel used by threat actors to manage bookings, payment verification, and dispatch fraudulent tickets to victims

The panel displayed live bookings in real time, with options to confirm, reject, delete or mail each order. The mail option, when triggered, automatically sends the fake PDF ticket to the victim's email address. This step is done manually by the operator, post verification of payment, to ensure the money has actually landed before the ticket is dispatched.

Snapshot of the bookings dashboard displaying victim order details, payment status, and administrative controls used to confirm payments and send fake tickets

The booking data collected through these sites also exposes potential victim data - names, phone numbers, email addresses - which is generally stored by these threat actors and then further sold as leads to other scam operations, making the victim vulnerable to a second wave of fraud.

Snapshot of a Telegram channel allegedly sharing user data as leads to other scam operation

Further the ticket price manager module allows operators to modify prices on the fly. This gives them the flexibility to increase prices during high-demand fixtures and drop them for less sought-after matches to keep the orders flowing. 

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Snapshot of the ticket price management module used by operators to dynamically modify fake IPL ticket prices and seat availability

We also identified the presence of Meta Pixel integration within the panel. Meta Pixel is a tracking tool that monitors visitor actions on a website - clicks, form fills, payment completions. 

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Snapshot of the admin panel showing active Meta/Facebook Pixel integration used to track victim interactions, monitor conversions, and optimise fraudulent ad campaigns

The conversions tracked through this pixel feed directly into Facebook Ads Manager and Facebook Events Manager, giving the operators visibility into which ad campaigns are driving the most victims, which creatives are converting, and what their return on ad spend looks like. This helps them to run optimised, data-driven fraud campaigns.

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Snapshot displaying the embedded Facebook Pixel tracking code identified within the scam infrastructure

Besides fake websites, such scams also operate heavily across platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and Telegram. These operations are run through accounts with artificially inflated follower counts, faceless Telegram groups, and Facebook groups that lend a false sense of scale and credibility.

Victims are drawn in through posts and reels promising tickets in black - at a premium, but guaranteed. What follows is a familiar pattern of false assurances, payment requests, and disappearing operators. Most of the time, victims do not receive anything except false hopes. 

Snapshot displaying the sale of fake tickets on Telegram channels 

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Snapshot displaying multiple active Facebook/Meta groups involved in scamming users under the guise of selling IPL tickets

Threat #2 - Fake IPL Live Streaming Sites & Malware Delivery

Not every IPL scam asks you for money directly. Some just need you to click.

Every season, millions of cricket fans who cannot afford or access official streaming subscriptions turn to free streaming sites. This is not a niche behaviour - it is widespread, and threat actors have built an entire malware delivery pipeline around it. 

CloudSEK identified multiple sites claiming to offer free IPL live streams, optimised for high-intent search keywords, and propagated across Reddit, Telegram, and Facebook. What these sites actually deliver is not a cricket stream. It is a multi-stage malware infection chain that can silently drain your crypto wallets, steal your passwords, backdoor your applications, and install a persistent remote access implant - all while you are waiting for the match to buffer.

How Victims Find These Sites

These sites do not wait for victims to stumble upon them. They are actively pushed.

On the SEO front, these sites are optimised for high-intent keywords - terms like "IPL 2026 free live stream," "watch IPL online free," "DC vs RCB live streaming" - designed to rank on Google alongside or above legitimate results. The metadata of one site CloudSEK analysed contained dozens of keyword-stuffed entries covering every IPL fixture, every competing tournament, and every possible search variation a cricket fan might type.

Screenshot of an unofficial streaming site appearing in Google Search results

Beyond search, these sites are propagated through Reddit threads in cricket subreddits, Telegram channels, and Facebook groups - posted as helpful "free stream" links by accounts that exist solely for this purpose. 

What makes this propagation particularly effective in 2026 is how it now extends beyond traditional search results. When users search for streaming options on search engines, AI-generated overviews and community-sourced recommendations increasingly surface these sites as viable options. 

During our research, a simple Google search for "free ipl unofficial streaming sites" returned an AI Mode summary that directly cited go.webcric.com and similar platforms as frequently recommended options across subreddits.

Snapshot displaying AI search results surfacing unofficial IPL streaming sites and channels based on indexed web content and community mentions

What Happens When You Land On The Site

The site itself looks functional. It has match listings, team logos, quality options - Low, Medium, High, HD - and a legitimate-looking navigation bar. But it is heavily monetised with multiple layers of pop-unders, redirects, and tracking scripts that intentionally hijack user navigation.

The moment you click anything - a "LIVE STREAM" button, a link, even the logo - JavaScript event listeners from the ad scripts intercept the click, prevent normal link behaviour, and force redirects in new tabs. This starts a redirect chain through several shady ad broker domains, designed to maximise ad impressions and deliver high-value payloads.

Snapshot of an unofficial IPL streaming website - WebCric, displaying suspicious pop-ups, intrusive advertisements, and deceptive overlay

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Snapshot of another unofficial IPL streaming website - Crictime, displaying deceptive overlay

Embedded in the site's source code is a User Agent detection script that identifies your operating system, browser, and device. The ad network reads this and routes you to an OS-appropriate advertisement. During our testing, we identified that Mac users get routed toward macOS-targeted malware. Windows users may receive a different chain entirely. This is what makes it particularly dangerous - it does not just remain an ad network, it becomes an OS-aware targeted distribution network.

Snapshot displaying User-Agent detection script identified within the site’s source code

The ClickFix Lure

While analysing these redirects, CloudSEK researchers identified that Mac OS users were mostly getting redirected to ClickFix style pages. One such redirect chain ended at a page impersonating a legitimate GitHub application installer or an Apple macOS security update page, depending on the campaign variant. The page provides detailed instructions to the victim to open the Terminal and paste the command to complete the installation. 

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Fake GitHub-style macOS installer page directing users to execute Terminal commands as part of the malware delivery chain

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Fraudulent macOS security update page impersonating an Apple security workflow to trick users into running malicious Terminal commands 

The command provided to the victim is :  

Snapshot of the command executing an obfuscated malware payload

The first line of the command echoes a fake Apple support URL to the terminal - pure social engineering to establish trust. The second line is the actual payload. After the user executes the provided Terminal command, a loader script is retrieved from the C2 and piped directly to zsh for execution.

The retrieved payload is not the final infostealer but rather a  Base64-encoded, Gzip-compressed second-stage loader. Its only purpose is to verify the necessary conditions on the system, download the actual core infostealer payload and execute it.

Snapshot of the Base64-encoded second-stage loade

Decoding this obfuscated payload reveals a shell script designed for silent, background execution on the victim's system.

Snapshot of the decoded shell script 

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The first thing the loader does is system fingerprinting by collecting the hostname, macOS version, external IP address, and keyboard layout information. It then checks whether the infected system uses a Russian keyboard layout (a common CIS geofencing technique).

If a Russian keyboard is detected, the script sends a "cis_blocked" telemetry event to the command-and-control server and terminates immediately to avoid infecting users in Russia or CIS countries.

If no Russian keyboard is present, the loader sends a "loader_requested" telemetry event and proceeds with its main objective. It silently downloads the final payload - a large malicious AppleScript using a spoofed browser User-Agent.

The downloaded AppleScript is executed directly in memory via in the background, with all standard input, output, and error streams redirected to /dev/null to ensure stealth.

CloudSEK researchers were able to retrieve and analyse the AppleScript payload. It is a full-featured macOS infostealer named - SHub Stealer, with extensive data theft, exfiltration, wallet backdooring, and persistence capabilities.

Snapshot displaying the macOS stealer variant 

Its capabilities include : 

Stealth and Anti-Analysis - The script begins by killing the Terminal application to reduce user suspicion. It creates a random temporary directory (/tmp/shub_/) for storing stolen data and uses extensive internal logging for its own operations while keeping most activities hidden from the user.

System Fingerprinting and Telemetry - The stealer collects detailed system information including username, hostname, macOS version, external IP address, and keyboard layout. It performs a CIS check by detecting Russian keyboard layouts. If a Russian keyboard is found, it sends a telemetry event and limits further activity. Otherwise, it sends multiple telemetry events (payload_started, password_obtained, data_collected, zip_sent, etc.) to the command and control centre. 

Credential Theft - The malware attempts to steal the macOS login password. It displays a fake “System Preferences” dialog (with the official LockedIcon) up to 10 times, asking the user to enter their password. It also tries to extract the Chrome master password.

Browser Data Theft - The stealer targets multiple Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Brave, Edge, Opera, Vivaldi, Arc, Sidekick,Orion etc.) and Firefox. It copies sensitive files such as Login Data, Cookies, Web Data, History, and extension data. 

Crypto Wallet Theft - SHub Stealer has a strong focus on cryptocurrency theft. It steals data from over 100 browser wallet extensions by scanning scans for specific extension IDs corresponding to crypto wallets. It also targets desktop wallets including Exodus, Atomic, Electrum, Guarda, Coinomi, Sparrow, Wasabi, Bitcoin Core, Monero, Ledger Live, and Trezor Suite.

Messaging and Cloud Theft - The script also steals the full Telegram Desktop session. It also exfiltrates the entire Keychain directory and iCloud accounts.

File and Document Grabber - A limited file grabber collects documents (.docx, .doc, .wallet, .key, .json, .rdp, etc.) and PNG images from Desktop and Documents folders, with a total size limit of approximately 150MB. It also steals Safari cookies, history, autofill data, and Apple Notes database.

Data Packaging and Exfiltration - All stolen data is saved under the random temporary folder. The script creates a zip archive. For large collections, it implements chunked uploading (splitting into ~70MB parts). The archive is uploaded to C2 along with metadata including the stolen password (if obtained).

Wallet Injection - If popular wallet applications (Ledger Live, Ledger Wallet, Atomic Wallet, Exodus, Trezor Suite) are installed, the malware replaces the legitimate app.asar file by injecting malicious code designed to exfiltrate wallet seed phrases. Since seed phrases serve as the master key for cryptocurrency wallets, possession of them allows the attacker to fully reconstruct the wallet and drain all associated funds. To maintain the appearance of legitimacy, the attacker also modifies the Info.plist file to preserve checksum integrity. 

Persistence Mechanism - The malware establishes persistence by creating a fake Google Update application and installing a LaunchAgent (com.google.keystone.agent.plist). This service runs every 60 seconds, and collects basic system information including the device UUID, hostname, IP address, and macOS version. It then sends a heartbeat request to the C2. If the C2 server responds with a base64-encoded command, the script decodes it, saves it as /tmp/.c.sh, executes it, and cleans up the file.

Final Actions and Cleanup - After uploading the stolen data, the script displays a fake error dialog stating “Your Mac does not support this application...” and performs basic cleanup of temporary files, although the persistence mechanism remains active.

This shows us how free IPL live streaming sites are not just a copyright problem - they can become an active malware distribution channel. What appears to be a harmless shortcut to watch the match turns out to be a carefully engineered trap, where a single click sets off a redirect chain that ends with your passwords, wallets, browser sessions, and crypto assets silently handed over to an attacker - with a backdoor left open for whatever comes next. 

Impact

  • Direct Financial Losses: Victims lose money through fake ticket purchases and payments to scammers - often via UPI with no way to recover funds.
  • Theft of Sensitive Personal Data: Personal information collected during fake bookings - names, phone numbers, email IDs is stored, reused, or sold to other fraud operations, exposing victims to further attacks.
  • Device Compromise and Malware Infections: Clicking on fake streaming links can result in full device compromise, including silent theft of passwords, banking credentials, browser sessions, and crypto wallets with a persistent backdoor left running in the background.
  • Secondary Targeting and Repeat Victimisation: Once identified as a paying victim, individuals are added to scam lists and targeted repeatedly across different fraud campaigns, including phishing calls
  • Crypto Asset Drainage: Victims with desktop or browser-based crypto wallets face complete fund loss through wallet injection attacks that replace legitimate apps with backdoored versions designed to exfiltrate seed phrases.
  • Psychological and Emotional Distress: Losing money at a moment of excitement, arriving at a stadium only to be turned away combined with the violation of a device compromise causes significant anxiety and distress.
  • Erosion of Trust in Digital Platforms: Repeated exposure to convincing fakes undermines fan confidence in legitimate ticketing platforms and digital payment systems, impacting broader digital adoption.
  • Normalisation of Cybercrime Ecosystems: The scale, sophistication, and near-zero consequences for operators normalise fraud infrastructure making each successive IPL season a more refined and harder-to-detect threat environment.

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Safeguards 

  • Buy tickets only from official platforms: Avoid third-party links from social media, ads, or unknown websites - even if they look legitimate or offer discounts.
  • Be wary of "too good to be true" offers: Discounted tickets, last-minute guaranteed availability, or deeply slashed prices are common bait used to lure victims into fake booking flows.
  • Avoid free streaming sites: Stick to official broadcasters and licensed apps. Free streaming links, especially those shared on Reddit, Telegram, or Facebook frequently act as malware delivery channels that can silently compromise your device.
  • Do not click on random links from SMS or social media: Bulk messages and DMs promoting ticket sales or streaming links are usually part of coordinated scam campaigns. When in doubt, go directly to the official platform.
  • Check website URLs carefully: Look for misspellings, unusual domain extensions (.online, .store, .live, .sbs), extra hyphens, or additional characters inserted into known brand names before entering any personal or payment details.
  • Limit app permissions: Be cautious when installing apps related to cricket, streaming, or ticketing. Never grant access to contacts, gallery, or SMS unless absolutely necessary. These permissions are routinely abused by malicious apps to harvest data and enable extortion.
  • Keep devices and browsers updated: Security patches close the vulnerabilities that malicious redirect chains and drive-by downloads rely on. Regular updates are one of the simplest and most effective defences.
  • Enable two-factor authentication: Activate 2FA on email, UPI accounts, banking apps, and crypto wallets to limit damage in the event of credential theft.

Conclusion

The IPL may last only a few weeks, but the risks surrounding it extend far beyond the final match. What appears as harmless excitement - booking tickets or watching a stream - can quickly spiral into financial loss, data theft, and long-term exploitation. 

As cybercriminals continue to refine their tactics each season, awareness remains the strongest line of defence. Staying cautious, verifying before trusting, and understanding how these scams operate can make the difference between enjoying the game and becoming part of the fraud ecosystem that thrives around it.

Sourajeet Majumder
Security researcher specializing in cyber threat intelligence and offensive security. Uncovers vulnerabilities, investigates threat actor infrastructure, and applies human intelligence techniques to detect and disrupt emerging threats.
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